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Abstract
Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) is a promising approach
whereby electric vehicles (EVs) are used to store
excess electricity supply (e.g., from renewable
sources), which is sold back to the grid in times of
scarcity. In this paper we consider the setting of a
smart car park, where EVs come and go, and can be
used for V2G while parked. We develop novel al-
location and payment mechanisms which truthfully
elicit the EV owners’ preferences and constraints,
including arrival, departure, required charge, as
well as the costs of discharging due to loss of ef-
ficiency of the battery. The car park will sched-
ule the charging and discharging of each EV, ensur-
ing the constraints of the EVs are met, and taking
into consideration predictions about future electric-
ity prices. Optimally solving the global problem
is intractable, and we present three novel heuristic
online scheduling algorithms. We show that, un-
der certain conditions, two of these satisfy mono-
tonicity and are therefore truthful. We furthermore
evaluate the algorithms using simulations, and we
show that some of our algorithms benefit signifi-
cantly from V2G, achieving positive benefit for the
car park even when agents do not pay for using it.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen increasing interest in electric vehi-
cles (EVs) as a key technology in the transition to a low-
carbon transportation future. In AI and particularly multi-
agent systems, recent work has discussed how the charg-
ing of EVs can be scheduled, e.g., to avoid bottlenecks in
local distribution grids [Valogianni et al., 2015; Robu et
al., 2013] or at EV charging stations [Gerding et al., 2013;
Rigas et al., 2013]. However, EVs can also help ensure grid
stability, especially as generation is shifting towards intermit-
tent renewable resources. This is achieved through the so-
called vehicle-to-grid (V2G) concept, whereby EVs are able
to sell energy back to the grid during periods of scarcity and
when energy prices are high.
In this paper, we use techniques from mechanism design
and online scheduling to address the problem of charging and
discharging multiple EVs. The setting we study is one of a
public car park, where EVs arrive dynamically and stay for
a period of time — during which they wish to be charged to
a particular state of charge (SOC), but can also be used for
V2G. Similar to existing work [Recalde Melo et al., 2014;
Kahlen and Ketter, 2015], the reason to focus on this setting is
that car parks have a larger size and “visibility” to the grid and
hence are more likely to be offered an advantageous contract,
or are able to trade in the wholesale market.
A crucial concern in addressing this problem, however, is
that discharging has a cost for each EV, as it affects the re-
maining useful lifetime (RUL) of its battery. These costs are
often EV-specific, as different vehicles have different types
of batteries and age, and they are private to each EV driver.
Moreover, when designing a charging/discharging schedule
of each EV, a number of other constraints need to be taken
into account, such as the driver’s intended departure time and
desired state of charge when leaving.
There has been considerable related work on V2G charg-
ing, typically focusing on how a demand response aggregator
(such as a car park, or a local microgrid) can optimise its
trading/balancing strategy using a number of available EVs
(see also Section 2). However, many of the proposed solu-
tions do not consider heterogeneous EVs with different costs
for discharging, arrivals and SOC constraints. In addition,
existing approaches assume the information about individual
EVs to be known by the aggregator. In contrast, we consider
EV owners to be self-interested agents with privately known
preferences and constraints, who may misreport this infor-
mation if this is to their benefit. Hence, we need to design
incentives to truthfully elicit this information. Truthfulness
(defined here using the strong notion of ex-post dominant-
strategy incentive compatibility) is an important property, as
it removes the strategic burden from EV owners. Moreover,
since the information is used to optimise the balancing strat-
egy, it results in more efficient outcomes.
Specifically, the contributions of our work are as follows:
• We formalise, for the first time, the V2G problem as an
online mechanism design problem. Specifically, we con-
sider a car park setting, where arriving EVs have differ-
ent discharging costs, required SOC and intended depar-
ture times, and this information is privately known. The
aggregator (e.g., car park owner) decides on a charging
and discharging scheduling algorithm and compensates
agents for their incurred discharging costs to (1) incen-
tivise truthful reporting, (2) minimise overall costs.
• We provide sufficient conditions for any scheduling and
payment mechanism to be truthful in this setting.
• We propose two specific truthful mechanisms and a third
mechanism, which is not necessarily truthful, but allows
EVs to rely more on internal trading rather than with the
grid. All three algorithms are scalable and can be used
for large settings.
• Finally, we compare the performance of our three mech-
anisms experimentally using simulations, showing that
they can achieve positive profits even when EVs do not
pay for the charge they receive.
2 Related Work
The concept of V2G has received considerable attention in the
area of power systems and energy economics. In this vein, the
seminal work by [Kempton and Tomic´, 2005] quantifies the
revenues that EVs could achieve by participating in different
electric markets: peak power shaving, spinning reserves and
regulation services, but they do not design actual control al-
gorithms for EV charging and discharging. Work which does
consider such algorithms includes [Shafie-khah et al., 2016;
Kamboj et al., 2011; Han et al., 2010; Shi and Wong, 2011;
Vasirani et al., 2013]. [Shafie-khah et al., 2016] use stochas-
tic programming to provide a strategy for a plug-in EV ag-
gregator agent to profitably participate in a demand response
market. They consider several methods to reason about prices
and to account for domain constraints (such as those coming
from transformer loading). However, their analysis is done
from the perspective of the aggregator, rather than individ-
ual EVs. Taking a multi-agent perspective, [Kamboj et al.,
2011] model a number of EVs providing anciliary services
to the grid as a coalition, and discuss how coalitional game
theory techniques could be used to divide the resulting re-
wards. [Han et al., 2010] and [Shi and Wong, 2011] model
the problem of EV charging as an MDP. Specifically, [Han et
al., 2010] use EVs for frequency regulation, and EVs are re-
warded for the time they are available, irrespective of how
much their battery capacity is discharged/recharged during
their stay, unlike our approach, in which effort is measured
proportionally to the amount discharged. Furthermore, none
of the above approaches consider the problem of strategic
EVs, requiring an appropriate mechanism to ensure partici-
pating EVs report their costs truthfully.
Online mechanism design has previously been applied to
EV charging, e.g., [Robu et al., 2013; Stein et al., 2012;
Valogianni et al., 2015], but these approaches do not consider
V2G settings. Other work considers a number of EVs work-
ing together as a virtual power plant (VPP), either to balance
a renewable resource [Vasirani et al., 2013] or to sell electric-
ity in the balancing market. In this vein, [Kahlen and Ketter,
2015] consider a car sharing service, in which drivers rent
and return vehicles at different locations. The system opera-
tors can decide which vehicles parked at each spot to use for
rental, and which to use as part of the VPP to provide regula-
tion services to the grid. Both of these consider the optimisa-
tion problem from the perspective of the VPP aggregator, and
do not guarantee truthfulness of individual EVs.
3 Formal Model
We consider the problem of a single smart car park, hence-
forth called the aggregator, where electric vehicles, hence-
forth called agents, arrive and leave over time.
The Agents. Let I denote the set of agents. An agent
i ∈ I arrives at time ai and has a privately-known type
θi = 〈di, qi, ci〉 representing the agent preferences and con-
straints, where di is the (actual) departure time, qi is the re-
quired amount of electricity by the departure time, and ci is
a discharging cost parameter (more details below). Impor-
tantly, note that, in this model, the required charge is a hard
constraint and, as a result, we do not need to include the value
derived from a certain amount of charge.
In addition, the agent’s battery has a (known) state of
charge at time t, denoted by SoCi,t and the current charg-
ing rate is denoted by ri,t = dSoCi,t/dt, where ri,t > 0
means the battery is charging and ri,t < 0 means it is dis-
charging. The entire charging and discharging schedule is
denoted by ri. Furthermore, limits are given by SoCmaxi ,
SoCmini , r
max
i and r
min
i . For simplicity we assume these
limits are known by the aggregator, but they could also be
elicited (i.e., be included as part of the private type). Given
this, we can describe the total amount charged and discharged
by time t as q+i,t(ri) =
∫ t
ai
max(0, ri,t′)dt
′ and q−i,t(ri) =
− ∫ t
ai
min(0, ri,t′)dt
′ respectively, noting that both these val-
ues are positive.
Charging and discharging a battery incurs a monetary cost,
since capacity generally decreases for each charge and dis-
charge cycle. This loss depends on many factors, but the main
ones are the state of charge and the rate of charge [Divya and
Ostergaard, 2009]. This translates into monetary costs when
the battery needs to be replaced, but also the inconvenience of
having a battery with lower capacity and requiring more fre-
quent charging. In general, we model the slope of the capac-
ity loss by w(SoCi,t, ri,t), which is assumed to be common
knowledge, and the total capacity loss incurred up until time t
is Wi(ri) =
∫ di
ai
w(SoCi,t, ri,t)dt. Using game-theoretic ter-
minology, this loss is also referred to as the amount of work
incurred [Archer and Tardos, 2001]. Importantly, we assume
that the costs are linear w.r.t. to ci, and therefore the total cost
incurred by an agent is ci ·Wi(ri). For some of the results and
in the simulations, we furthermore assume a constant loss per
unit of (dis)charge, i.e., w(SoCi,t, ri,t) = a · ri,t, for some
constant a. This is a reasonable approximation if the state
of charge never gets too low (i.e., if SoCmini is sufficiently
high). By putting charging and discharging costs together
(i.e., any discharging needs to be compensated by charging
to reach the required charge qi), the work function simplifies
to Wi(ri) = a · q−i,di(ri).
The above results in the agent utility:
ui(ri, τi) = −ci ·Wi(ri) + τi (1)
if the following constraints are met:
• ∀t ∈ [ai, di] : SoCmini ≤ SoCi,t ≤ SoCmaxi and
rmini ≤ ri,t ≤ rmaxi
• SoCi,di ≥ qi
and is ui(ri, τi) = −∞ otherwise, where τi are monetary
transfers from the aggregator, detailed in Section 4.
The Aggregator The aggregator determines the charging
and discharging schedules and the transfers, and sells any ex-
cess elecricity to the grid and purchases any shortfall. We as-
sume that electricity prices change over time and the buy and
sell prices can also differ. Let pbuyt ≥ psellt denote the buy and
sell prices at time t and furthermore let rI,t(ri) =
∑
i∈I ri,t
denote the overall/net (dis)charge at t. Given this, we can
compute the aggregator utility, uagg , as follows:
uagg =
∫
t∈T
−min(0, rI,t) · psellt −max(0, rI,t) · pbuyt dt
−
∑
i∈I
τi, (2)
where T is a time interval, e.g., 24 hours.
4 The Mechanism Design Problem
As is common in the mechanism design literature, the main
goal is to maximise the social welfare, SW , which equals the
sum of utilities of all agents (Equation 1) and the aggregator’s
utility (Equation 2) [Nisan et al., 2007, Ch.9].1 Maximising
this is also known as maximising market efficiency. Noting
that transfers cancel out, this results in:
SW =
∫
t∈T
−min(0, rI,t) · psellt −max(0, rI,t) · pbuyt
−
∑
i∈I
ciw(SoCi,t, ri,t)dt, (3)
subject to individual agent constraints.
Although obtaining optimal social welfare is generally not
possible (due to uncertainty of prices and future arrivals, as
well as tractability issues, as discussed in Section 5), in or-
der to be effective, the aggregator first needs to elicit the pri-
vate information from the agents. To this end, on arrival each
agent i is asked to report their type, where the report is de-
noted by θˆi = 〈dˆi, qˆi, cˆi〉.2 We assume that the aggregator
can observe the arrival time, ai, of the agents and their state
1An alternative goal is to maximise aggregator utility and, while
here we focus on social welfare, we do measure the aggregator profit
in the empirical evaluation (see Section 7).
2There is a subtle difference with traditional online mechanism
design, where agents are also asked to report their arrival. In the
parking scenario, the physical arrival and departure can be observed
by the aggregator. However, to produce a (dis)charging schedule,
the aggregator needs to know the intended departure, which is what
dˆi signifies here.
of charge. Furthermore, it can verify the departure time, di,
ex-post, meaning once the agent has actually departed. Given
this, the mechanism design problem is to determine the charg-
ing rate ri,t at each time ai ≤ t ≤ di and transfers (payments
to the agents) such that the agents have an incentive to report
truthfully, i.e., such that reporting θˆi = θi is a dominant strat-
egy for each agent i. Such a mechanism is also said to be
truthful. Next we provide sufficient conditions for a mecha-
nism to be truthful in our setting.
Our results are an extension of [Archer and Tardos, 2001].
In [Archer and Tardos, 2001], necessary and sufficient con-
ditions are given for a setting where the type is given by pa-
rameter ci only. To account for the remaining parameters, let
 define an ordering over types such that θ′i  θi means that
either q′i < qi, d
′
i > di or c
′
i < ci (intuitively, θ
′
i is a ‘better’
type for the mechanism in one of the dimensions). Further-
more, let fi(θˆi) = fi(dˆi, qˆi, cˆi) determine agent i’s allocation
as a function of his reported type, i.e., ri = fi(θˆi). Given
this, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 1. The mechanism is truthful if the following con-
ditions are met:
1. (Monotonicity of Work) Whenever θ′i  θi then
Wi(fi(θ
′
i)) ≥Wi(fi(θi))
2. The transfers are computed on (observed) departure and
are given by:
τi = hi + cˆi(Wi(fi(di, SoCi,di , cˆi))−W 0i )
+
∫ ∞
cˆi
(Wi(fi(di, SoCi,di , x))−W 0i )dx, (4)
where W 0i is the minimum required work to get to the
state of charge on departure (i.e., without additional dis-
charging), and hi is a constant which does not depend
on the report (but could, e.g., depend on the observed
arrival and departure). Note that transfers are calcu-
lated based on actual departure, which we assume the
mechanism can observe ex-post.
3. SoCi,t = qi for t ≥ dˆi
Proof. First, note that, due to the second term, the transfers
always compensate the agent’s costs for any additional work
done (i.e., work done on top of getting to the required charge)
and, in fact, typically, due to the third term in Equation 4, the
agent is better off when doing more work (and is never worse
off). As a result, the agent has no incentive to overreport qi
and report an earlier di since this will only lead to less work.
If the agent truthfully reports di, then he also has no incen-
tive to underreport qi since, due to condition 3, his state of
charge would be insufficient and his utility −∞. An inter-
esting case is reporting qˆi < qi and dˆi > di when the agent
knows the mechanism will temporarily charge above qˆi with
the intention to discharge later, and this could result in more
work. However, since the transfer is based on the actual state
of charge and on the actual departure, it is the same as if he
had reported qˆi = SoCi,di and dˆi = di. Therefore, while
the agent has done more work, he does not get compensated
for it and only incurs the costs. As a result of the above, the
agent has no incentive to misreport qi or di. Given this, we
can use the result from [Archer and Tardos, 2001, Theorem
4.2] to show that the agent also has no incentive to misreport
ci.
5 The Online Scheduling Problem
We now focus on the problem of setting the (dis)charging rate
of the EVs in the car park in order to obtain a high social wel-
fare (as defined by Equation 3). Now, optimising this problem
is intractable for our setting. An additional challenge is that
future arrivals as well as grid prices are generally unknown.
To this end, we assume that a probability distribution of the
prices is known, that the number of prices is finite and that
charging decisions are made at discrete time steps. This way,
the problem can be formulated as a Markov decision process
(MDP), and solved by dynamic programming. While solving
this optimally is tractable for a single EV, with multiple EVs
we need to consider all combinations of states for each EV.
This leads to an exponential increase in the number of states,
which very quickly becomes intractable. Therefore, we pro-
pose three different heuristics:
Algorithm 1. This algorithm only bases decisions on cur-
rent prices and does not consider future prices. Let ρlow and
ρhigh, ρlow ≤ ρhigh, denote two thresholds. Each EV i cur-
rently in the car park will be charged if pbuyt ≤ ρlow (i.e.,
if the price is below a threshold) at a constant rate as long as
SoCi,t < qi. Furthermore, an EV will be discharged at a con-
stant rate if psellt − ciw(SoCi,t, ri,t)/ri,t ≥ ρhigh (i.e., if the
marginal profit is above a certain threshold) as long as there
is sufficient time to recharge to get to the required SOC qi by
the departure time.
Algorithm 2. The second algorithm considers future grid
price distributions and optimises the expected utility for each
vehicle i independently, given the price distributions, and as-
suming each agent buys and sells directly from the grid, i.e.,
assuming τi =
∑di
t=ai
(−min(0, ri,t) · psellt −max(0, ri,t) ·
pbuyt ). The optimal solution is a policy which specifies a
charging schedule for each realisation of the prices, and can
be solved using dynamic programming.
Note that, in Algorithms 1 and 2, while the (dis)charging
decisions are made independently for each agent, the demand
and supply is first aggregated within the car park and elec-
tricity is only sold to (bought from) the grid if there is a
net surplus (deficit). Therefore, whenever there is a situation
where one EV charges and, at the same time, another dis-
charges, instead of buying or selling from the grid, one EV
will be used to charge another one, saving pbuyt − psellt ≥ 0.
Furthermore, note that Algorithm 2 is globally optimal when
∀t : pbuyt = psellt .
Algorithm 3. Algorithm 2 is optimal for an individual EV,
but the optimal policy ignores potential benefits that can be
achieved by discharing one vehicle in order to charge another
one. To address this, Algorithm 3 takes the solution from Al-
gorithm 2 as the basis, but then considers whether the social
welfare can be improved further by adjusting the immediate
charging rate of the agents. In more detail, let EU∗i,t(SoCi,t)
denote the expected utlity of agent i from time t onwards
given the current state of charge, assuming the agent buys
and sells directly from the grid, and using the optimal policy
from Algorithm 2. Then:
EUi,t(ri,t, SoCi,t) = −min(0, ri,t)·psellt −max(0, ri,t)·pbuyt
−ciw(SoCi,t, ri,t) + EU∗i,t+1(SoCi,t + ri,t)
is the expected utility when agent i (dis)charges at rate ri,t at
time t and then proceeds with the individual agent’s optimal
policy from time t + 1 onwards (given the updated state of
charge according to the current charging rate).
Note that, in Algorithm 2, the current charging rate is set to
r∗i,t = argmaxri,tEUi,t(ri, SoCi,t). Instead, here we set the
current charging rates of all agents in order to (myopically)
maximise the social welfare as follows:
(r∗1 , r
∗
2 , . . .) = arg max
ri,t,i∈I
∑
i∈I
EUi,t(ri,t, SoCi,t) (5)
Note that, unlike Algorithm 2, this algorithm may (dis)charge
an EV if is not optimal for the individual EV, but when it
contributes to the social welfare.
6 Algorithm Properties
In this section we prove that Algorithms 1 and 2 are truthful
when the cost per unit of (dis)charge is constant (i.e., when
w(SoCi,t, ri,t) = a · ri,t, see also Section 3). Recall that,
according to Theorem 1, in order for these algorithms to be
truthful, we need to show that ex-post monotonicity of work
holds, for each of the type parameters. Note that we can con-
sider each parameter independently, as long as monotonicity
holds for a parameter independent of the remaining param-
eters. If monotonicity holds, the payments defined in Theo-
rem 1 can be used to assure truthfulness.
Towards a proof, we first introduce bounds on the state of
charge of a battery at any given time t for an agent i. In
more detail, since we require that SoCi,di = qi to guarantee
truthfulness (Theorem 1), and due to the physical constraints
on the (dis)charging rate and SOC of the agent, the algorithms
above have an upper bound ubi,t and a lower bound lbi,t on
the state of charge at time t given by:
ubi,t = min{SoCmaxi , qi − rmini · (di − t)}
lbi,t = max{SoCmini , rmaxi · (di − t)− qi}
We are now ready to show the monotonicity properties of
the proposed algorithms w.r.t. each type dimension.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 guarantees monotonicity of work
w.r.t. cost parameter ci, i.e., ci ≥ c′i → Wi(fi(θi)) ≤
Wi(fi(θ
′
i)), when the cost per unit charge is constant (i.e.,
independent of charging speed or state of charge).
Proof. Let θi and θ′i denote two identical types except for
the costs ci and c′i respectively, and w.l.o.g. we assume that
ci > c
′
i. In addition, let ri and r
′
i denote the respective allo-
cations and SoCi,t and SoC ′i,t the respective SOC. Note that
SoCi,ai = SoC
′
i,ai
and SoCi,di = SoC
′
i,di
= qi. Further-
more, note that the bounds ubi,t and lbi,t are the same for
the two types θi, θ′i because they do not depend on the cost
(which is the only difference between them). To prove mono-
tonicity we need to show that: ci ≥ c′i → Wi(ri) ≤ Wi(r′i).
However, since Wi(ri) = a · q−i,di(ri), it is sufficient to show
that q−i,t(ri) ≤ q−i,t(r′i) for any ai ≤ t ≤ di. For this to hold,
we need to show that, for any setting, one of two conditions
always holds:
1. If ri,t > 0 then ri,t ≤ r′i,t, or, if ri,t < 0 then ri,t ≥ r′i,t,
i.e., θ′ does at least the same work as θ.
2. If ri,t ≥ r′i,t and ri,t > 0 then, after charging, the SOC
of θ′i is equal to or higher than the one of θi, meaning
that q+i,t(ri) ≤ q+i,t(r′i), or, if ri,t ≤ r′i,t and ri,t < 0
then, after discharging, the SOC of θ′i is equal to or lower
than the one of θi, meaning that q−i,t(ri) ≤ q−i,t(r′i).
Next, we divide all possible settings into four cases reflect-
ing the fact that, at any time t, the system can either charge
(ri,t > 0) or discharge (ri,t < 0) and that SoCi,t is either
greater than, equal to, or lower than SoC ′i,t. Note that in Al-
gorithm 1 the upper bound ubi,t is always equal to qi because
the algorithm never overcharges the battery, i.e., SoCi,t ≤ qi
and SoC ′i,t ≤ qi for any t.
Case 1: SoCi,t ≥ SoC ′i,t and ri,t > 0. The fact that the
mechanism decides to charge type θi means that the price
pbuyt is advantageous for θi given her cost parameter ci. Since
ci > c
′
i, this necessarily implies that charging is the optimal
choice also for θ′i. Indeed, assume that the optimal decision
for θ′i is r
′
i,t < ri,t. This implies that p
buy
t is more advanta-
geous for θi then for θ′i. Since the price p
buy
t is the same for
both types, the one with the highest benefit is the one with
the lower cost, i.e., ci < c′i. However, this contradicts our
assumption that ci > c′i. Thus, ri,t ≤ r′i,t. Note that, if
ubi,t constrains r′i,t, then also ri,t is constrained by it because
SoCi,t ≥ SoC ′i,t. Thus, Condition 1 is satisfied.
Case 2: SoCi,t ≤ SoC ′i,t and ri,t < 0. This case is symmet-
ric to Case 1.
Case 3: SoCi,t ≤ SoC ′i,t and ri,t > 0. First note that, given
the results of cases 1 and 2 and the fact that ubi,t = qi, we
have that SoCi,t ≤ SoC ′i,t → q+i,t(ri) ≤ q+i,t(r′i). Now, as
with case 1, if it is optimal to charge θi then charging is the
optimal decision also for θ′i. However, in this case ubi,t may
impose a constraint on r′i,t but not on ri,t, i.e., ri,t > r
′
i,t.
Nevertheless, note that it is never possible that, after charging,
the SOC of θi is higher than the one of θ′i because ubi,t affects
θ′i only when her SOC becomes equal to qi. Consequently, the
decision of charging θi at t never leads to the case in which
q+i,t∗(ri) > q
+
i,t∗(r
′
i) at a future time t
∗ . Thus, Condition 2 is
satisfied.
Case 4: SoCi,t ≥ SoC ′i,t and ri,t < 0. This case is symmet-
ric to Case 3.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 2 guarantees monotonicity of work
w.r.t. the cost parameter, i.e., ci ≥ c′i → Wi(fi(θi)) ≤
Wi(fi(θ
′
i)), when the cost per unit charge is constant (i.e.,
independent of charging speed or state of charge).
Proof. The structure of this proof, the notation used, and the
logical steps are the same as the ones in the proof of Theo-
rem 2. The only difference is the analysis of the four cases
that we now present.
Case 1: SoCi,t ≥ SoC ′i,t and ri,t > 0. First note that the
upper bound ubi,t never constrains r′i,t to be lower than ri,t
because SoCi,t ≥ SoC ′i,t.
The mechanism chooses to charge type θi as this option is
optimal for her, i.e., given the current buying price pbuyt and
the expected future buying and selling prices, it is optimal for
θi to buy electricity at time t.
Assume that SoCi,t ≥ qi and that the optimal option for θ′i
is ri,t > r′i,t, i.e, θ
′
i is not charged as much as θi at time t .
This naturally implies that θ′i has a better buying opportunity
in the future. If not, since ci > c′i, θ
′
i would have charged
the battery at t at least as much as θ because this would have
guaranteed her at least the same benefit that θi gets. How-
ever, note that θi and θ′i have the same market opportunities
in terms of buying and selling prices because these prices are
independent of the agents type. Thus, if there is a better buy-
ing option for θ′i than the current one, the same option would
have been available and optimal also for θi. But this contra-
dicts the initial assumption. Thus, we proved that ri,t ≤ r′i,t,
i.e., Condition 1 holds.
Now observe that, when SoCi,t < qi, the decision of
charging θi is taken without considering that the electricity
will be sold because SoCi,di < qi. Given this, the choice
of charging is optimal as long as the state of charge is be-
low qi. However, this situation correspond to the one dis-
cussed in Case 3 of Theorem 2 where we show that the de-
cision of charging θi at t never leads to the case in which
q+i,t∗(ri) > q
+
i,t∗(r
′
i) at a future time t
∗, hence Condition 2
holds.
Case 2: SoCi,t ≤ SoC ′i,t and ri,t < 0. The analysis of this
case can be easily derived from the one of Case 1, as the two
cases are symmetrical.
Case 3: SoCi,t ≤ SoC ′i,t and ri,t > 0. The only difference
between this and Case 1 is that SoCi,t ≤ SoC ′i,t. The only
effects of this difference is that ri,t ≤ r′i,t may not be pos-
sible. However, what was discussed in Case 3 of Theorem 2
can be applied here with the only difference that ubi,t ≥ qi
(instead of ubi,t = qi).
Case 4: SoCi,t ≥ SoC ′i,t and ri,t < 0. The analysis of this
case can be easily derived from the one of Case 3, as the two
cases are symmetrical.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 guarantee mono-
tonicity of work w.r.t. departure time di, i.e., di ≤ d′i →
Wi(fi(θi)) ≤Wi(fi(θ′i)), and required amount of electricity
qi, i.e., qi ≥ q′i →Wi(fi(θi)) ≤Wi(fi(θ′i)).
Proof. Sketch Let θi and θ′i denote two types which are iden-
tical except for either departure time, and in this case, w.l.o.g.,
we assume di ≤ d′i, or for required amount of electricity, in
this case, w.l.o.g., we assume qi ≥ q′i. The proofs by contra-
diction used in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 hold also in case
of departure time and required amount of electricity, i.e., if
there is no constraint imposed by ubi,t and lbi,t then θ′ is
(dis)charged at least as θ. However, in this case ubi,t and lbi,t
may be different from ub′i,t and lb
′
i,t, i.e., the bounds may de-
pend on the agent type. Nevertheless, the way in which an
earlier departure and a higher requested amount of electric-
ity affect these bounds is by making them more strict, i.e.,
ubi,t ≤ ub′i,t and lbi,t ≥ lb′i,t. The proof follows from the
fact that stricter bounds naturally impose stricter constraints
on an agent’s work.
7 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we empirically evaluate our algorithms in a
range of realistic settings, in order to determine their poten-
tial for implementing smart car parks. We are particularly in-
terested in two key metrics: social welfare (Equation 3) and
aggregator utility (Equation 2).
7.1 Experimental Setup
We simulate a large car park over a period of 24 hours, where
most cars arrive in the morning, representing a typical work-
place. Specifically, time is discretised into 1-hourly time
slots, and the number of arrivals at every hour is drawn from
a Poisson distribution with a mean that varies over time and
peaks at 8am. Unless specified otherwise, the expected num-
ber of arrivals over the entire day is 100 cars, and each car
stays in the car park for between 1 and 16 hours (drawn uni-
formly at random) or until midnight, whichever is earlier.
We discretise a car’s battery into units representing 3 kWh
each, which we assume is the electricity that can be charged
or discharged in one hour. To determine the initial state of
charge of agent i, SoCi,ai , and its maximum state of charge,
SoCmaxi , we draw two integers from the interval 1 to 8 and
assign the smaller to SoCi,ai and the larger to SoC
max
i . This
means that vehicles have a battery capacity of up to 24 kWh,
which is the typical capacity of current EVs. The required
charge qi is determined by randomly picking a feasible charge
given the vehicle’s duration of stay and maximum capacity.
We assume constant capacity losses for charging and dis-
charging a unit of electricity (a in Section 3) and draw these
for each agent from a uniform distribution on [$0.01, $0.03].
Finally, the cost parameter ci is drawn from the interval [1, 5],
discretised into steps of 0.1.3
Grid prices are simulated using a Markov chain that ran-
domly starts in one of four states. Each state s is associ-
ated with a buying price pbuy,s (respectively, these are $0.03,
$0.15, $1.20 and $3.00 for states 1–4) and a selling price
psell,s = 0.75pbuy,s. With probability 0.5, this Markov chain
remains in the current state and otherwise transitions to one
of its direct neighbours. These states represent off-peak and
peak times, with some intermediate steps.
To test Algorithm 1, we consider a range of thresholds
based on the prices that can occur in the various states.
Specifically, we set ρlow = ρhigh = pbuy,s for each state s.
In addition to Algorithms 2 and 3, we also consider a NoV2G
algorithm, which does not allow discharging but charges to
minimise the overall expected cost. This represents a base-
3This is to facilitate the computation of the transfers, as given in
Theorem 1. In practice, the method described in [Babaioff et al.,
2010] could be used instead.
line benchmark against which we compare our algorithms, in
order to quantify the benefit of using V2G for smart car parks.
7.2 Results
In the following, we vary a range of system parameters to test
our algorithms in different settings. First, we are interested in
how the number of vehicles in the car park affects the perfor-
mance of the algorithms. To this end, we vary the expected
number of arrivals over the course of the day from 10 to 300.
Results are shown in Fig. 1a (social welfare) and 1b (aggre-
gator utility).
Here, it is clear that Algorithm 1 performs poorly, even for
the best threshold setting. This is mainly because the algo-
rithm does not use a model of how prices evolve in the future
and so takes poor decisions that lead to costly charging ac-
tions in the future. However, for the right choice of param-
eters, Algorithm 1 can perform better than the NoV2G base-
line, in terms of both aggregator utility and social welfare.
Algorithms 2 and 3 perform significantly better than any of
the other benchmarks, achieving a positive aggregator utility
in most cases. This means that the costs for buying electricity
and paying vehicles for providing their battery for V2G are
fully covered by the gains of selling electricity when prices
are high.
While the utility is low in some settings, it is important
to note that the aggregator here does not actually demand
a payment for the electricity the agents receive or the park-
ing service itself. In practice, this would be added (e.g., at
a fixed rate per unit of required charge and per time parked),
increasing the utility further. Furthermore, while the utility
and welfare of Algorithms 2 and 3 are similar, their respec-
tive behaviours are not. Algorithm 2 tends to trade more with
the grid, while Algorithm 3 relies more on charging and dis-
charging internally.
Next, we consider how the availability of agents in the
market affects the performance of the system. Specifically,
Fig. 1c shows the effect of varying the maximum duration of
an agent’s stay in the car park. As welfare and aggregator
utility are similar in all settings we tested (with utility being
consistently higher), we now concentrate on the latter. Here,
two opposing effects can be observed. Initially, as the dura-
tion increases, agents demand more charge as their feasible
options increase, leading to a drop in welfare and aggregator
utility (as noted above, this is partially because agents do not
pay for the electricity they receive in this setup). However, as
it increases further, the flexibility of agents increases, because
they have more time beyond what is required to reach their
desired charge. This leads to more opportunities for V2G,
increasing the aggregator’s utility.
We now turn to how features of the electricity market af-
fect the performance of the V2G car park. To investigate this,
we vary the probability of staying within a given price state,
indicating how static the market is. This is shown in Fig. 1d,
where it is clear that a more dynamic market (lower proba-
bility), leads to a higher utility for the aggregator. This is
because there are more opportunities for buying at low prices
and selling at high prices. A static market, in turn, means that
the market may remain at a high price state for the entire day,
leading to high electricity costs.
(a) (b)
(c) (d) (e)
Figure 1: Results (with 95% confidence intervals, based on 1000 samples for each data point) in various settings. 1a and 1b
show the social welfare and aggregator utility, respectively, when the number of agents is increased. 1c shows the effect of
agents with increasing availability for charging, 1d varies the dynamism of prices and 1e varies the gap between buying and
selling prices.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between buying
and selling prices in Fig. 1e, by setting the selling prices
to psell,s = bpbuy,s and varying b from 0 to 1. Clearly, a
higher selling price results in higher aggregator utility, and it
is also evident that Algorithms 2 and 3 perform similarly to
the NoV2G algorithm when prices are too low. Interestingly,
Algorithm 3 here outperforms Algorithm 2 slightly, as it en-
ables agents to trade electricity internally.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
To the best of out knowledge, this is the first work that for-
malises the V2G problem as an online mechanism design
problem. We identify sufficient conditions for truthfulness,
design three algorithms for this scenario, two of which are
proved to be truthful, and empirically evaluate them.
There are several extensions we leave to future work. First,
we aim to model more realistic battery types, where the cost
increases with the number of charging-discharging cycles and
costs are non-linear in the (dis)charged amount of electric-
ity. Other issues relevant for practice include losses during
discharging, and batteries with different round-trip efficien-
cies. Second, a range of other algorithms could be designed
or adapted for this problem, such as those recently devel-
oped in the field of online stochastic combinatorial optimi-
sation [Scott et al., 2013]. Finally, we aim to evaluate our
techniques using a real case study and data, such as modelling
the arrival and departure of EVs in a shopping center.
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